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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANiTY-THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE FORMULATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH
CAROLINA*
The traditional majority definition of legal insanity is ex-
pressed in MeNaghten's Ca8e.1 That venerable rule established in
1843 reduces the basic issue to the question of "whether the ac-
cused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing
an act that was wrong." Many jurisdictions while essentially
adhering to the McNaghten Rule have also theorized that the
cognitive factors are not the only elements that may preclude
inhibition; that even though cognition still obtains, mental dis-
order may produce a total incapacity for self-control. This irre-
sistible impulse doctrine is primarily an inquiry as to whether, at
the time of his criminal act, the accused suffered from a diseased
mental condition which deprived him of the will to resist the
insane impulse. It has been applied to supplement the basic
MeNaghten formula in those jurisdictions which recognize it.2
Dissatisfaction with the McNaghten-Irresistible Impulse Rule
arose, and the search for alternatives dates back to 19543 and
Durham v. United ,States,4 the first open rejection of the Mc-
Naghten-Irresistible Impulse formula.5 The supplanting rule
adopted by the Durham court was the simple statement that "an
* United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
1. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
2. The primary importance of this rule has been as a supplement to
McNaghten. See, e.g., Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957);
Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150 N.E2d 914 (1958); Thompson
v. Virginia, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284 (1952).
3. Actually New Hampshire never adopted the McNaghten rule, and since
State v. Peak, 49 N.H. 399 (1870), it has employed a product-type formula to
which Durham has similarities.
4. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
5. As was stated in United States ex. rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 567
(3d Cir. 1951) (dissent), the McNaghten Rule assumes " a logic-tight com-
partment in which the delusion holds sway leaving the balance of the mind
intact." This is the basic objection to McNaghten. The human mind is an
entity and cannot be broken into parts, one sane and the other insane. In
focusing on the cognitive aspect of personality, McNaghten made no allowance
for those who could distinguish good and bad, but could not control their
behavior. This one-sided emphasis on the cognitive "straitjacketed" psychiatric
testimony in that these experts were forced to answer the question whether the
defendant could "know" right from wrong, and were unable to explain other
symptoms which pointed to irresponsibility.
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accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of a mental disease or defect."8 This rule avoided
MHcag tei's excessive emphasis on the cognitive element of the
personality, and it further allowed psychiatric experts to testify
to all relevant information about a defendant, rather than to
limited opinions about whether he knew right from wrong.
"Durham was a right step in the wrong direction,"7 however, for
in its simplicity it had failed to define the key terms used-
"disease," "defect" and "product." It was "couched as an abstract
indefinite generality ... whereas the [right-wrong] standard
was a concrete proposition that laymen could apply." This
vagueness posed the threat that bewildered juries might abdicate
their roles as the triers of fact in favor of the opinions of tech-
nically rather than legally oriented psychiatrists.
"Every court which... considered Durham... rejected it," 9
and the American Law Institute chose in 1955 to adopt in its
Model Penal Code a different rule, stating that:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of a mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.
(2) The term mental disease or defect does not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct.10
This rule has proved more acceptable than Durham. Since its
formulation the Fifth" and Eighth 12 Circuits have paid lip
service to the institute's efforts while adhering to the traditional
MoNagiten Rule, as supplemented by the irresistible impulse
doctrine. The District of Columbia,13 Third,14 and Tenth 5 Cir-
6. Durham v. United Siates, 214 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
7. Blocker v. United States, 288 F2d 853, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (dissent).
8. United States v. Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 46, 52 (D.D.C. 1957).
9. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
10. MODEL PE1NAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
11. Carter v. United States, 325 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1963).
12. Carter v. United States, 332 F2d 728 (8th Cir. 1964).
13. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
14. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
15. Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 18
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cuits have altered their rules so as to closely conform to the Model
Penal Code formula.16
In February of 1966 the Second Circuit, indicating that
HoNaghten and the previously applied alternatives had become
outdated in the light of recent advances permeating the field of
criminal psychology, in United States v. Freeman'7 became the
first of the courts of appeal to accept the Model Penal Code
definition of insanity without modification. Durham began the
search for an alternative to the McNaghten-Irresistible Impulse
Rule, and Freeman marks at least a temporary end to that search,
for the rule it established appears to be the most feasible alter-
native yet provided.
The majority of our courts have thus far been hesitant to adopt
any new ideas concerning the determination of insanity ques-
tions, principally because none of the alternatives yet provided
have offered a reliable means of moving away from the old
formula. Durham failed, and the partial applications of the code
formula have not been truly significant. The impetus behind the
movement for change has been scholastic rather than practical,
and the reluctance to change undoubtedly reflects a distrust of
formulas suggested by psychiatrists, who have not yet agreed
among themselves upon an adequate definition of "mental dis-
ease." The Model Penal Code formula adopted in Freeman can
solve this dilemma because its terminology bridges the gap
between the time tested, but outdated, AeNaghten Rule used in
16. The Tenth Circuit in Wion adopted in toto the Institute formula, but
included a jury charge about defendants ability "to know what he was doing."
(The Institute used "appreciate" to reflect that "knowledge" divorced from
any appreciation of the import thereof is useless.) The District of Columbia
Court achieved its similarity in the context of the Durham formula. It first
required a critical relationship between the disease and the alleged act (Carter
v. United States, 252 F2d 608 [D.C. Cir. 1957]; Douglas v. United States,
239 F.2d 52 [D.C. Cir. 1956]) and, more importantly, defined "disease" and
"defect" to include any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavioral
controls. (McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 751 [D.C. Cir. 1962]). The
Third Circuit in Currens adopted as its test only the "capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law" facet of the Institute test, probably in an
attempt to be shed of McNaghten's cognitive emphasis. The Freeman case
points out, however, that McNaghten was faulty not in that it dwelt on the
cognitive, but that it did so exclusively. It might be well to note that the Ninth
Circuit is the only other circuit court to face squarely the issue of possible
departure from the McNaghten rule. It held in Sauer v. United States, 241
F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1964), that it would await the Supreme Court for change,
feeling itself bound by that Court's precedent (See note 25 infra). It did go
on record, however, as rejecting both the Durham and Currens rules. Whether
that court avoided mention of the MoDa.L PE AL CODE formula because it felt
that this might be the direction of future change is yet to be seen.
17. 357 F2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
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the courts and the updated, but untested, theories of the legal
laboratory. Freeman inculcates recent advances in insanity trials,
primarily in its liberalization concerning the use of expert
testimony, into a formula which is a clear statement in modern
terms of the old McNaghten - Irresistible Impulse Rule. It
achieves a clarity in definition of the issues which partial adop-
tions of the code have missed. The Freeman court recognized
that the suggested test may require "futher emendation in the
light of tomorrow's discoveries," but it has at least established
a formula which can presently remedy the problem of reconciling
past and present.
Freeman is basically an attempt to translate the traditional
Meaghten (plus irresistible impulse) formula into modern
terminology. The "substantial capacity" terminology was em-
ployed in order to eliminate black and white thinking. While the
presence of any defect may not be sufficient to establish legal
insanity, a finding of total incapacity may likewise be unneces-
sary. "Appreciate" replaced "know" because of the prevailing
view that even though one might have intellectual awareness
that his act is wrong, this can have little significance when
divorced from appreciation of the moral or legal import of
behavior. Freeman is also an attempt to provide for meaningful
psychiatric testimony. Psychiatric testimony is approved when
that testimony is based on "thorough" examination, with the
provision that such testimony is to be admitted only as expert
testimony, and not as legal pronouncement. With respect to this
expanded use of psychiatric testimony, Freeman involves change
from MoNaghten, but the basic theory undergirding the Model
Penal Code rule adopted therein is a restatement of the same
elements-cognition and volition-which are the bases for the
MoAaghten-Irresistible Impulse Rule. This latter is the test used
presently in many states and, previous to the post-195d changes,
all federal courts.
South Carolina's rule on insanity was basically formulated in
1898 by the Supreme Court's approval of a circuit court charge
stating in part:
[T]o relieve himself from responsibility . . . he must show
that . . .by reason of a mental defect . . . at the time of
the act he did not know that the act he committed was
wrong, or criminal, or punishable .... [I]f he is... cap-
able of forming a correct judgment as to its being morally or
legally wrong he is . . .responsible .... [T]he difficulty
[Vol. 18
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would be great ... of establishing satisfactory proof wheth-
er an impulse was or was not uncontrollable.' 8
Many years and numerous cases' 9 have seen no change, and in
its most recent confrontations with the insanity problem the
court in 1957 continued its repudiation of the irresistible impulse
doctrine20 and in 1961 reaffirmed loyalty to the McNaghten
Rule.21 Bundy was decided at a time when "the subject of the
mind and its influence on the body is very difficult and obscure,
even to the most learned," and a question arises as to whether
recent progress on mental study has not so elucidated the in-
sanity issue as to reveal fallacies in the rule adopted under that
early decision. Revision seems to be necessary, and Freeman. pro-
vides for the first time a means of properly accomplishing this
end.
The adoption of Freeman in South Carolina would occasion a
departure from our present rule, but change should involve fewer
problems than at first seem apparent. Our courts presently em-
ploy rules of evidence sufficiently liberal to pose only minor
problems in the adoption of Freeman s provisions regarding ex-
pert testimony.2 2 The most critical problem would be the lack
of any volitional (irresistible impulse) clause within our rule.28
Many courts have refused to accept the doctrine of irresistible
impulse because of the difficulty involved in actually proving
the existence of such impulses. Freeman meets this problem by
requiring that the impulse be the result of a proved mental defect
in the nature of an actual physical abnormality and not a mere
tendency toward antisocial conduct.24 While South Carolina has
perhaps been wise in its nonrecognition of the vague irresistible
impulse position, it cannot be doubted that valid irresistible im-
pulse situations do occur. Freeman acknowledges that such voli-
tional problems exist, and its formulation offers a precise and
affirmative method of submitting them to a jury.which must in
South Carolina stretch McNaghten in order that the irresponsible
18. State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 439, 58 Am. Rep. 262 (1898).
19. E.g., State v. Fuller, 229 S.C. 439, 93 S.E.2d 463 (1956) ; State v. Keller,
224 S.C. 257, 78 S.E2d 373 (1953); State v. Gilstrap, 205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E2d
163 (1944) ; State v. McGill, 191 S.C. 1, 3 S.E.2d 257 (1939) ; State v. Jackson,
87 S.C. 407, 69 S.E. 883 (1910).
20. State v. Allen, 231 S.C. 391, 98 S.E.2d 826 (1957).
21. State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E2d 623 (1961).
22. Id. at 170, 121 S.E2d at 625.
23. State v. Allen, 231 S.C. 391, 98 S.E2d 826 (1957).
24. MODEL P=NAL CODE, § 4.01 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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not be criminally incarcerated. Much of the uncertainty concern-
ing the irresistible impulse idea has been removed, and it should
be recognized that this new formulation offers a very real oppor-
tunity to improve the legal approach to insanity.
One further point concerning the prospective importance of
Freeman should be noted. The adoption of an insanity rule based
on its theory will present potential problems of crowded facili-
ties in that it provides for compulsory incarceration of those who
are adjudged insane, while present South Carolina law25 makes
such incarceration discretionary with the trial judge. The Free-
man rule would increase the number of those sent to mental
facilities for two reasons. Judges would be required to commit all
individuals to appropriate facilities upon a finding of criminal
insanity, and juries would be more willing to find an individual
criminally insane if they were aware that the criminally insane
are automatically incarcerated (that is, that those found not guil-
ty by reason of insanity will not be set free). One of the most
appealing advancements indicated in Freeman is that the crim-
inally insane would be incarcerated in mental institutions rather
than in penal facilities. The detention must last until rehabilita-
tion is satisfactorily completed; therefore the possibility is elim-
inated that there will be the recidivism which might follow a
short non-rehabilitative jail sentence.
The Freeman court could put no teeth into its compulsory
detention requirement, for at present there is no federal law re-
quiring such incarceration. The court was constrained to leave
this matter of enforcement to the states until such a law could
be effected. South Carolina is fortunate in having the legal
framework by which to effect such incarceration, but our law
providing for discretionary incarceration must be amended to
make that incarceration mandatory. It would be possible to adopt
the Freeman definition of insanity without initiating this pro-
gram of compulsory detention, but to do so would rob the rule
of one of its key points. Even if it is necessary to do this until our
facilities are capable of handling an increased number of pa-
tients, however, the Freeman definition of insanity should be
adopted.
Freeman has presented South Carolina and the majority of
American jurisdictions with a workable alternative to the
McNaghten Rule, and concurrently with the problem of whether
change is proper at the present time. Favoring a change is the
25. S.C. CODE AN.' §§ 32-969, -970 (1962).
[Vol. 18
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fact that under the perceptive eye of the Supreme Court26 there
is a growing trend in the courts toward the idea of a revision of
insanity law. The decisions since Durham have muddied the
water of the insanity problem, and our highest Court must soon
act to clarify the issues. When a decision comes it is doubtful
that McNaghten will be its basis for a preponderance of the re-
cent Supreme Court decisions27 provide liberal allowances for
individual freedoms. A liberal insanity rule would be in keeping
with this trend. A liberalization in the approach to legal deter-
minations of insanity appears inevitable, and the only choice
available to the states may well be whether to initiate the change
or await it.
The issue is still in flux, and the ultimate solution to the prob-
lem may not yet exist. A better solution than McNaghten does
now exist, however, and it deserves close consideration.
ALBERT L. JA~as, III
26. In spite of the influx of conflicting opinions since Durham, the United
States Supreme Court has not yet chosen to clear the confusion with a definitive
statement of what the law of insanity should be. In fact the Supreme Court
last dealt extensively on the insanity problem in Matheson v. United States,
227 U.S. 540 (1913) ; Hotema v. United States, 186 U.S. 413 (1902), and the
twin Davis cases, Davis v. United States (I), 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Davis v.
United States (II), 165 U.S. 373 (1897). In these cases the Court gave approv-
al to jury charges employing McNaghten, but the correctness of that rule as
opposed to any other theory was not in issue. Subsequent cases are equally bar-
ren of direct challenge to McNaghten. (In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
[1952], the Court held that there was no due process requirement for the states
to stop using the Right-Wrong test.) The ambiguity which has resulted has left
different opinions as to whether the lower court can adopt views other than
McNaghten. The Ninth Circuit in Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1965), held that it could not act until the
Supreme Court or Congress did so, but the Third Circuit in United States v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), the Tenth in Wion v. United States, 325
F2d 420 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1965), the District of
Columbia in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), and the
Second in United States v. Freeman, 357 F2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966), have held
that there is no compulsion on lower courts to use McNaghten. It is felt that
the highest Court would have granted certiorari in some of the many cases
which have reached it, if it wished to clear the muddy water. Perhaps, as has
been suggested, the Supreme Court has not laid down a rule because it is
motivated by a desire to see the issue discussed and developed on the lower
levels before it makes a definitive statement.
27. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INQUIRY INTO GUILTY PLEAS-
RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*
The Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Rizzo' brings to
issue a problem that is not of novel impression, but is neverthe-
less in a state of some confusion to both the courts and the legal
profession. That problem concerns the extent and depth to which
a trial judge must question one accused of a criminal act in order
to determine whether or not the accused understands the conse-
quences of his plea of guilty before the court may accept such a
plea.
The law is well settled in the federal courts by Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 and in the vast majority
of state courts by either case or statute s that a plea of guilty will
not be accepted unless it is in fact voluntarily given, without coer-
cion, intimidation or threats.
The problem, however, turns on two primary questions left
unanswered: what is voluntary; and what is awareness of the
oonsequenoes? The factors involved and their relative importance
in arriving at a determination of voluntariness and awareness
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from circuit to cir-
cuit. The Supreme Court has to this date refused certiorari to
decide the above questions.
A. The Prooblem
In the Rizzo case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit sustained the conviction of Vincent Michael
Rizzo. Under the first count of a two-count indictment the de-
fendant had been charged with the transportation of a stolen
motor vehicle in interstate commerce in violation of a federal
statute.4 The second count charged bank robbery. At his arraign-
* United States v. Rizzo, 362 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1966).
1. 362 F2d 97 (7th Cir. 1966).
2. "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the
court, nwoo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and
shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made volun-
tarily with understanding of the nature of the charge .. " FED. R. CaMr. P.
11.
3. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 423(2) (1961).
4. "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce, a motor vehicle
or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than
$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2312
(1950).
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ment the defendant waived a formal reading of the indictment,
and pleaded not guilty. The case was called for trial in the
United States District Court at which time the government was
granted its motion to dismiss Count II of the indictment. After
a brief recess the defendant's counsel advised the court that the
defendant wished to withdraw his plea of not guilty to Count I,
and enter a plea of guilty.
Before acceptance of the guilty plea, the following colloquy
took place between the court and the defendant:
COURT: Well, Mr. Rizzo, are you satisfied with Mr. Mc-
Donald's [defense counsel] representation of you?
MR. RIZZO: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: And he has consulted you, and you have talked
with him regarding your plea in this case?
MR. RIZZO: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Has anybody made any promises to you of any
kind as to what disposition will be made of this case upon
your plea of guilty?
MR. RIZZO: No, sir.
COURT: And you enter this plea of guilty freely and vol-
untarily?
MR. RIZZO: I do, Judge.
COURT: Without any promises of any kind by the District
Attorney, your lawyer, or anybody else, including this court?
MR. RIZZO: That's right, your Honor.
COURT: All right, it is this Court's duty to advise you that
under your plea of guilty-and you do desire to enter a plea
of guilty?
MR. RIZZO: I do, your Honor.
COURT: It is this Court's duty to advise you that under
the plea of guilty, this Court has the power to impose a sen-
tence of not to exceed five years in the penitentiary, or a
fine not to exceed $10,000, or both.
Knowing that, do you persist in your plea of guilty?
MR. RIZZO: I do, your Honor.
COURT: Now, in fairness to you, I want to tell you that
Mr. McDonald did, with Mr. Brown [the Assistant U. S.
Attorney], discuss the disposition of this case in the event
a plea was entered, and I told Mr. McDonald, and I tell you,
that -what I will do in this case upon the disposition of the
plea will depend upon the pre-sentence investigation.
1966]
9
et al.: COMMENTS
Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH CA OLinA LAw RLvmw
No promises -were made, as to what the Court will do. Do
you understand that fully?
MR. RIZZO: Yes, your Honor.
GOURT: All right, and knowing that, do you persist in your
plea of guilty?
MR. RIZZO: Yes, I do, your Honor.
COURT: All right, the plea will be accepted. There will be
a finding of guilty.5
On his appeal the defendant contended that the trial court
had violated rule 110 by acceptance of his guilty plea without
a determination of his understanding of its consequences.
The circuit courts discussion of the record showed that:
Rizzo had the benefit of consultation with his attorney re-
specting both his case and his plea; represented to the court
that he had such consultation, and that he was satisfied with
it; advised the court that no promises had been made to him
in return for his plea of guilty, was advised of the possible
maximum penalty which the court could impose on him
under his plea of guilty; and that the court did not accept
the plea summarily, but acted after conversation with, and
observation of Rizzo, which put the court in a position to
make an assessment of Rizzo's demeanor.7
From the circustances and facts revealed by its examination
of the record, the court determined that the trial judge, had in-
formally satisfied the requirements of rule 11 before its accept-
ance of the defendant's plea of guilty.
B. Cases In Conflict--The Inquiry
Any accurate analysis of the problems to be encountered in the
evolution of standardized procedures, by which courts may be
guided in the acceptance of guilty pleas, must begin with a de-
termination of the very ramifications of such a pleading. A plea
of guilty is a formal criminal pleading s and leaves the court
only to give judgment and sentence. 9 It is a confession of guilt
made in a formal manner. It is an admission, or conclusive ad-
5. United States v. Rizzo, 362 F.2d 97, 99-100 (7th Cir. 1966).
6. Supra, note 2.
7. United States v. Rizzo, 362 F.2d 97, 100 (7th Cir. 1966).
8. Bankey v. Sanford, 74 F. Supp. 756 (D.Ga. 1948); Cooke v. Swope,
28 F. Supp. 492 (D.Wash. 1939).
9. Ibid.
[Vol. 18
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mission or proof of guilt.10 Except that it may be withdrawn and
another plea substituted for it, a plea of guilty is equivalent to
and is as binding as a conviction after a trial on the merits.1
It has the legal effect of a verdict of guilty; therefore, it autho-
rizes the imposition of the punishment prescribed by law. Ac-
cordingly, it leaves no issue for the jury.'
2
The examination and ruling on the guilty plea made by the
district court in the Rizzo case may be said to be typical of that
performed by most federal trial judges, and would seemingly
satisfy most interpretations of rule 11.
It is generally recognized that while a court may not accept
a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is made
voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge,
there is no particular form or ritual which must be adhered to
in maldfig this determination.'3 One case illustrative of this prop-
osition is United States v. Swaggerty,14 in which the court held
that, "there need not be any particular ritual in order to comply
with the Rule [Rule 11], that the trial court shall not accept a
guilty plea without first determining that it is made voluntarily,
and with understanding of the nature of the charges, and there
may be circumstances from which it is evident that defendant
has the requisite understanding."' 5
Swaggerty further held that, "the Rule did not require that
explanation be made by the trial judge personally, and it is suf-
ficient if defendant has requisite understanding from another."16
It is suggested that Rizzo, decided eleven years later by the same
circuit, flies into the face of the Swaggerty doctrine. The con-
fusion is further intensified by the decision in United States v.
Davis' 7 which the same court cited as authority in reaching a
seemingly conflicting result in Swaggerty. In Davis, the court
10. Maye v. Pescor, 162 F2d 641 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Langston v. United States,
153 F2d 840 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Bugg v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1940).
11. Smith v. Rhay, 254 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Fox, 130
F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1942).
12. Ibid.
13. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd 356 U.S. 26;
United States v. Swaggerty, 218 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1955); Harris v. United
States, 216 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264 (7th
Cir. 1954); Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1952).
14. 218 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1955).
15. Id. at 879.
16. United States v. Swaggerty, 218 F2d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 1955). See also
Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1950).
17. 212 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954).-
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held that a trial court shall not accept the plea of guilty without
first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with an under-
standing of the nature and consequence of the charge. The rule
is stated in mandatory language, and the court is not relieved of
the duty which it imposes solely because the accused is repre-
sented by counsel of his choice.' In point with the Davis case,
the Second Circuit's discussion in United States v. Lester19
should be noted. The opinion of the majority in Lester inter-
preted rule 11 as requiring something more than a perfunctory
examination by other court personnel or the prosecutor. Further,
a mere standardized inquiry or the asking of several routine
questions falls short of discharging the trial judge's obligation
under the Federal Rules. Judge Waterman, in writing for the
majority, discussed several general interrogatories necessary to
adequately reach a decision regarding the admission of a plea of
guilty. The court suggested that a discussion between the judge
and the accused should include an investigation of the circum-
stances under which the plea is made; a showing by the defend-
ant of familiarity with the crime alleged and awareness of the
nature of the charges; the statutory offenses included within
them; the range of allowable punishments thereunder; possible
defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation. In addi-
tion it must be shown that the plea was not improperly induced
by the prosecutor or the result of coercion or threats. 20
In summary, the court stated that "such a determination may
be made by a penetrating, and comprehensive examination of all
the circumstances under which the plea is made." 2' 1
In accord with the Lester case, the Ninth Circuit in Munich v.
United States2 2 held that a defendant may understand the na-
ture of the charge to which he is pleading guilty, without the plea
being truly voluntary. The record of the Munich trial showed
only that the defendant "understood the nature of his plea."23
The appellate court reversed the conviction requiring that the
record disclose "that the defendant understands the meaning of
the charge, what acts are necessary to establish guilt and the
consequences of pleading guilty2 4
18. Id. at 267.
19. 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957).
20. Ibid.
21. United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1957).
22. 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964).
23. Id. at 360.
24. Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 18
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It has been suggested "that a brief discussion with the de-
fendant regarding the nature of the charges may normally be
the simplest and most direct means of ascertaining the state of
defendant's knowledge," 25 before acceptance of a guilty plea.
The Lester-Munich position can not yet be said to be a panacea
for rule 11. The requirement of inquiry, assuming that there is
such, is still beset with controversy.
Illustrative of the contrast to Lester-Munich is the Tenth Cir-
cuit's case of NunZey v. United States.26 In Nunley, the defendant
had previously been convicted of four prior narcotic violations.
On appeal of a subsequent conviction, the transcript of record
showed that the defendant was advised of the nature of the
charges and of the possible penalties. In response to a single
question of the court as to whether he wanted to plead guilty,
Nunley replied "plead guilty." The appellate court found that
while no express determination was made, the guilty plea was
entered voluntarily. It adequately appeared that the defendant
knew the nature of the charges, was experienced in the ways of
criminal proceedings and was well aware of the entire situation.
His conviction was affirmed.
2
The effect that defense counsel has on the trial judge's inquiry
is a further source of confusion. In the Swaggerty case the duty
seemed to be discharged by the retained attorney's statements
that he had previously advised the defendant of the nature of
the charge and possible consequences of a guilty plea.28 In
United States v. Shepherd,29 it was held that the rule providing
that the court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with an under-
standing of the nature of charge, imposes no obligation on a
court to make such inquiry when the defendant is represented
by counsel.30
It appears that on this point, Swaggerty and Shepherd repre-
sent a minority view. Such reliance on the defense attorney, who
is in many cases court appointed, is unwarranted. It is an at-
tempt to shift the positive duty of rule 11 from the court to the
trial counsel, clearly in derogation of the congressional intent
behind rule 11.
25. United States v. Davis, 212 F2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1954).
26. 294 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1961).
27. Ibid.
28. United States v. Swaggerty, 218 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1955).
29. 108 F. Supp. 721 (D. N.H. 1952).
30. Ibid.
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The majority of the federal courts have shown that representa-
tion of a defendant by counsel does not in itself fulfill the re-
quirement of the rule, but is a circumstance which may fairly
be taken into account in determining the nature and extent of
the inquiry to be made.3l
7. Conclusion
lNoting the fact that the burden of proof is normally on the
defendant who moves to vacate sentence to prove his allegations,
it is suggested that the requirements of due process require a
searching and comprehensive examination by the court before
accepting a plea of guilty. This seems to be especially true in
light of Miranda v. Arizona,32 where the Supreme Court served
notice of the heavy burden upon the court where the protection
of due process is involved.33
In order to effectuate the proper application of rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of 6iminaZ Procedure, the trial judge, before
accepting a plea of guilty, should make an independent, exten-
sive and searching investigation into the plea. The depth and
degree of this inquiry should depend on the circumstances, facts,
seriousness of the offense, demeanor of the accused, and the
wealth of the court's past experience. Suggested guidelines may
include:
(1) Is the plea a result in any way of threats, coercion, fear
or force?
(2) Does the defendant show an awareness of the nature of
the charge?
(3) Is the accused familiar with the offenses included within
the charge?
(4) Is there a statement of possible maximum punishments?
(5) Are possible defenses suggested?
(6) Does the defendant have knowledge of the possible con-
sequences of the plea?
(7) Is there a discussion of the acts necessary to establish
guilt?
31 United States v Baysden, 326 F2d 629 (4th Cir. 1964) ; United States v.
Diggs, 304 F2d 929 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Long v. United States, 290 F.2d 606 (9th
Cir. 1961) ; Kennedy v. United States, 259 F2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958).
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. Ibid.
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(8) Is the plea a recognition of guilt and an admission of the
criminal act?
It is obvious that in view of the finality and conclusiveness of
the plea of guilty, it should be treated with at least as much
caution as attends the acceptance of a simple confession. It is in-
conceivable that any court could adopt any position which might
possibly undermine the rights of a criminally accused in light
of the fortification given to these rights by recent United States
Supreme Court decisions.
H. Srmci KnmG
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LABOR LAW-INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT*
The relation of a collective bargaining representative to those
whom it represents has long been a subject of controversy.1 The
United States Supreme Court in Republic Steel Corp. v. Mad-
doxw2 evidenced its reluctance to suggest courses of action which
might be available to an individual whose grievance has been
refused process by his union. It stated that "[i]f the union re-
fuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the individual's claim,
differences may arise as to the forms of redress then available."3
The plight of an individual employee in this type of situation
is further exemplified by Belk v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., Inc.4
where the court stated that, "[w]here his remedy lies when his
union refuses to prosecute his claim, we leave to future cases as
they arise."5 The case of Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Iwn.
has arisen and is unique in that it spells out the courses of action
that the courts in Belk and Republic Steel refused to enumerate.
Serra involved an employee whose union refused to institute a
contract grievance procedure on his behalf. The court held that
the employee was entitled to bring an action against his employer
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA).7
A. Exclusive Union Control Under the Bargaining Agreement
Recognition of the proposition that an employee should be al-
lowed to sue his employer in his own right is to recognize that
an individual employee has certain "vested interests" over which
his union does not have exclusive control. There are, however,
persuasive reasons supporting the argument for exclusive union
control. Generally, the union is the party most experienced and
qualified to prosecute a claim. Grievances settled with individuals
would impair union prestige by tending to make it appear unnec-
* Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
1. Compare Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAv. L. Rav. 601
(1956), with Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbi-
tration, 37 N.Y.UL. REv. 362 (1962).
2. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
3. Id. at 652.
4. 315 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1963).
5. Id. at 516.
6. 248 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
7. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
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essary or ineffective. Further, there is a need for an orderly and
uniform method of processing grievances that will establish a
framework within which the union and employer can operate
with relative harmony. Most important, individual interests rare-
ly exist independently of the collective interests involved. From
the employer's viewpoint, vesting exclusive control in the union
would simplify management's relation with its employees and
settled grievances would have an appealing finality.
Vesting exclusive control in the union, however, may subordi-
nate individual rights and may endanger satisfactory achieve-
ment of those ends which collective bargaining purports to pro-
tect. Union officials, in an effort to acquire a possible overall
advantage for the majority, might be willing to "trade off" the
claim of an individual. Because the grievance procedure is sus-
ceptible to abuse, union officials could single out minority groups
for arbitrary treatment. In Cortez v. Ford Motor Co.,8 for ex-
ample, women were systematically laid off in violation of the
seniority provision of the collective bargaining agreement. The
union granted preference to male employees basing its disregard
of the terms of the contract on the proposition that the affected
jobs were too heavy for women.
Beyond these dangers of malice, majority intolerance, or of-
ficial insensitivity, there are less tangible but more pervasive
values. One of the functions of collective bargaining is to
replace vagrant discretion with governing rules. The indi-
vidual, by his ability to insist that those general rules be
observed, gains an assurance of fair and equal treatment
and a sense of individual worth.9
If the union has exclusive control over grievance procedures and
can bar access to any neutral tribunal, individual rights may well
be denied.
B. Retention of Individual Employee Rights
Significant in the development of the law regarding the rights
of an individual employee is the case of Textile Workers v. Lin-
coln Mills.'0 There the Supreme Court held that section 301 (a)
8. 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W2d 523 (1957).
9. Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 394 (1962).
10. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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of the LMRA." authorized the federal courts to fashion a body
of federal law based upon the national labor policy. Having de-
cided in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp.12 that section 301(a) did not grant
federal courts jurisdiction to hear individual complaints for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court in
Smith v. Evening News Ass'nz8 reversed itself and announced
that the federal courts could take such jurisdiction. These deci-
sion set the stage for case-by-case determinations in the federal
courts of the extent to which federal labor statutes prevent in-
dividual claims from being disregarded in favor of majority
interests.
Retention of certain rights by the individual under a collec-
tive bargaining contract was emphatically demonstrated by the
court in Berra. In enunciating existence of these rights, the court
stated that federal statutory law provides for three possible
courses of action which an aggrieved employee can seek to
utilize.
14
First, the proviso of section 9(a) of the LMRA'I5 allows him
to attempt to compel his employer to follow the contract griev-
ance procedure. Second, he may bring action against his union
for breach of the duty of fair representation. Third, he can bring
an action against his employer under section 301(a) of the
LMRA. 16
After giving the majority union exclusive bargaining capacity,
section 9(a) is qualified by a proviso stating that:
[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right to present grievances to their employer and
to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention
of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment
is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That
the bargaining representative has been given the opportunity
to be present at such adjustment.17
11. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
12. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
13. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
14. Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 684, 686 (N.D.
Ill. 1965).
15. 61 Stat. 143 .(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
16. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
17. L.M.R.A. § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
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It has been argued that this proviso does not create any affirma-
tive rights in the individual employer but that it merely pro-
vides that the employer's duty to bargain with the majority
union is not violated if he chooses to hear and adjust grievances
with individuals. Under this rationale, the proviso is only a quali-
fication on the majority union's right to represent; therefore, the
employer may lawfully agree with the union not to process in-
dividual grievances and may give the union the only legal right
to initiate the grievance procedure.' 8 Those opposing this re-
stricted view of the proviso believe its language to be plain and
its statutory history clear in giving to the employee an affirma-
tive right to present grievances directly to the employer. This
interpretation of the proviso would inevitably prevent the estab-
lishment of a contractual procedure under the collective bargain-
ing agreement which would deprive the employee of his indi-
vidual remedy.' 9
It would seem that this right of presentation would be worth-
less to an individual unless the courts supplement it by allowing
him the right to compel arbitration after the presentation of his
grievance. The courts, however, have tended to recognize that
union control over the contract grievance procedure is an im-
portant prerogative and have apparently deprived the individual
of any substantive relief under section 9(a).
Through a series of recent cases there has evolved a court-
imposed condition precedent which must be found present before
an individual may exercise the right of compelling his employer
to arbitrate. In Ostrofsky v. United Stee~workers2° only the
union and the employer were given the right to demand arbitra-
tion under the collective bargaining agreement unless the em-
ployee could show that the union had breached its duty of fair
representation. In another case, BacA-Clawson Go., Iw. v. Inter-
national Assn of Mach.,'2 1 the court would not allow an indi-
vidual to prosecute a grievance or force his employer to arbitrate
it after concluding that the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement gave him no such right. In Brandt v. United States
Lines, Ine.,22 the court held that the terms of the collective bar-
18. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAzv. L. REv. 601, 621-24
(1956).
19. Summers, supra note 9.
20. 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), affd 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
21. 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
22. 246 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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gaining agreement prevented an individual employee from being
able to compel his employer to arbitrate in the absence of a
showing that the union failed to represent him "adequately."23
Imposition of this requirement that the employee first show a
breach of the duty of fair representation seems to have reduced
the effectiveness of section 9 (a) with regard to individuals, be-
cause such a showing is a difficult one for the employee to make.
Assuming that the individual can show that the union has
breached its duty of fair representation, he is put to the option
of either attempting to compel his employer to arbitrate or of
bringing an action against his union for the breach. This latter
choice is a course of action suggested by the court in Serra.
The individual employee's right to fair representation by his
union was firmly established by Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. 2 4
where the Court compared the duty of the union to the duty of
the legislature of a democracy. The union is subject to limitations -
on its power to represent its members, but is also under an affirm-
ative duty to protect their rights equally. In Hughes Tool Co. v.
NLRB 25 the court recognized that the duty of a union to process
the meritorious grievance of an employee grows out of the
union's duty of fair representation. It seems, however, that unless
there is a clearly established case of union discrimination against
the employee by its refusal to process his grievance, he will have
difficulty in showing that the union has breached its duty of
fair representation. 28 The difficulties attendant upon such a
showing by an employee were emphasized by the Supreme Court
in Humphrey v. Moore,27 where it was determined that a union
must have a broad range of discretion in determining whether
a particular grievance has merit.28 The Court stated further that
the union should be allowed to sift out claims of questionable
merit as well as those found to be wholly frivolous.29 It was held
that the union could not be guilty of breaching its duty of fair
representation without some showing that it had acted with bad
faith, hostility or discrimination toward the individual em-
ployee. Apparently, therefore, an individual employee cannot
23. Id. at 984.
24. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
25. 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
26. Comment, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Con-
tracts, 73 YALE LJ. 1215, 1219 (1964).
27. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
28. Id. at 349.
29. Ibid.
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bring an action against his union for breach of its duty of fair
representation predicated upon a refusal to process his claim
unless he can prove that the union acted in bad faith.
The third course of action suggested by the court in Serra
is that an individual whose union has refused to process his
grievance may bring action against his employer for breach of
the collective bargaining agreement under section 301 (a) of the
LMRA.30 In Smith v. Evening News As's 1 the Supreme Court
recognized that an individual may have standing to maintain an
action under section 301 but refused to enumerate the circum-
stances under which such an action could be brought. It was
established in Republic Steel Co. v. Maddox82 that an individual
can bring action under section 301 but that he must first "at-
tempt" to use the contractual grievance procedure.88 This ex-
haustion prerequisite encourages the use of the prescribed griev-
ance procedure and recognizes that it is an integral part of the
collective bargaining process. The court in Serra significantly
treated the union's refusal to prosecute an individual's complaint
as a satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement. Similarly, in
Fiore v. Associated Trans., Inc.," the court refused to require
that an employee submit his claim to the grievance procedure
upon an alleged failure of the union to prosecute his claim.
Application of the principles evolved through these cases indi-
cates that an individual employee who alleges that his union has
refused to prosecute his claim and that there has been a breach of
the collective bargaining agreement, will be allowed to bring
action against his employer under section 301(a) of the LMRA.
C. Relief for the Individual Employee
The courts have left unanswered the broader question of exact-
ly what relief they would be willing to grant if after accepting
jurisdiction they find that the collective bargaining agreement
30. 61 Stat. 156(a) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). Section 301(a)
provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
31. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
32. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
33. Id. at 652.
34. 255 F. Supp. 596 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
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has in fact been breached. In Humphrey the Supreme Court was
not required to answer this question because the individual's
claim was held to be unfounded. Further, most of the recent cases
dealing with the rights of an individual under section 301 have
only required that the courts decide whether the individual
should be allowed to bring the action.,, In the event, therefore,
that the individual's claim is found to have merit, it is uncertain
what protection the courts would provide.3 6 It would seem that
section 301 (a) provides no definite protection to an individual
employee, other than allowing the federal court to hear his case.
The court in Berra suggested three courses of action available
to an individual whose union refuses to process his grievance.a'
The first, an attempt to compel the employer to arbitrate by
presenting the grievance directly to him under section 9(a) of
the LMRA, seems to require that the individual first be able to
prove that the union refused to process in bad faith. The second,
an action against the union for breaching its duty of fair repre-
sentation, provides relief only where the employee can clearly
show that the union acted unfairly or discriminated against him.
This course of action is substantially weakened by the courts'
refusal to restrict the union's discretionary power over "ques-
tionable" claims. The best alternative available to the individual
alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement and the
union's refusal to prosecute his claim is to bring an action against
his employer under section 301(a) of the LMRA. Even where
the court finds a meritorious claim, however, the decisions have
not clearly defined any method by which the individual em-
ployee may secure enforcement of his alleged rights.
The courts apparently recognize a distinct need for allowing
flexibility between the employer and the union in dealing with
borderline grievances as they arise. While such a recognition
undoubtedly promotes labor-management stability, it may do
so at the expense of an individual's grievance which his union
has, in good faith, refused to process.
JAMEs J. BAn)wn
35. E.g., Doty v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 362 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1966);
Henderson v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 290 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1961);
Salvatore v. Allied Chem. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.W. Va. 1965).
36. See, Comment, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor
Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1229 (1964).
37. Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 684, 686 (N.D. Ill.
1965).
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WILLS-DOCTRINE OF FACTS OF INDEPENDENT
SIGNIFICANCE--VALIDITY OF DEVISE
TO TRUSTEES UNDER THE WILL
OF ANOTHER*
The doctrine of facts of independent significance is one of
several principles applied by the courts to effectuate the inten-
tions of a testator. The posture of the South Carolina Supreme
Court concerning application of this doctrine to gifts to trustees
under the will of another was rendered unclear in the recent
decision of South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Copeland.1
On September 8, 1963, Mfiss Sarah Linda Welch died leaving
an estate valued at more than one million dollars. This fortune
was amassed as the result of investments made for the decedent
by her brother, Robert. On December 27, 1949, upon Robert's in-
sistence, Sarah signed a will prepared by Robert's attorney.
Article II of her will devised and bequeathed her estate to the
trustees of the Houston Foundation if at the time of her death
Robert were living. This foundation was a perpetual charitable
trust which had been created by Robert's will in 1948 and funded
by his 25 million dollar bequest to it. Article III of the will
provided:
If at the time of my death my said brother shall have died
leaving a will, duly probated, by which property is devised
and bequeathed to trustees for charitable purposes, then it
is my will and I so direct that in lieu of the devise and be-
queath contained in the preceding Article II all of said rest
and residue of my property shall be devised and bequeathed
to said trustees named in my said brother's will upon the
same terms and conditions, for the same uses and purposes,
and subject to the same limitations and restrictions as if
the language in my said brother's will creating said trust
and setting forth said terms and conditions, said uses and
purposes and said limitations and restrictions, were copied
at length herein with appropriate changes to make them a
part of my will.2
One codicil, providing that all funds of the trust were to be
used only in Texas, was executed by Robert prior to the execu-
* South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Copeland, S.C. , 149 SE2d 615
(1966).
1. S.C. ,149 S.E.2d 615 (1966).
2. Id. at ,149 S.E2d at 618.
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tion of Sarah's will. It further provided that the trustees under
his will did not have to use property willed to the trust by others
exclusively in any particular state unless directed to do so. A
perpetual inter vivos trust indenture was executed by Robert
on December 1, 1949, transferring property to the trustees and
reserving the power to name the trustees in his will. Subsequent
to the execution of Sarah's will, Robert executed three codicils
to his will which effected changes in the terms of and disposi-
tions to the foundation trust. In the first he reserved the power
to name the trustees of the foundation in his will. The second
provided that the trustees of the inter vivos trust would be suc-
ceeded by persons named in his will upon probate of his will.
The third codicil made substantial changes in the disposition of
Robert's property, giving to individuals fifteen per cent of the
estate formerly going to the trust. Robert died in 1952, and his
will was admitted to probate.
The executor of Sarah's estate argued that she clearly intended
to leave her estate to the trustees of the Texas trust and that
Robert's will was an act of independent significance showing to
whom the gift was made.3 The South Carolina Supreme Court,
declining to rule on the doctrine of facts of independent signifi-
cance, held that Sarah's attempt to set up a South Carolina trust
was void because the terms were not effectively declared; there-
fore, the estate was distributable as intestate property.
The Statute of Wills4 requires that a will be attested and sub-
scribed to in the presence of three witnesses. The purpose of the
statute is to prevent fraud, duress and mistake." Strictly inter-
preted the statute would exclude any writing not contained in the
will itself. Since a strict interpretation would lead to the defeat
of the testator's express intent, a number of exceptions to the
rule have evolved. Exceptions allowing one will to be used in the
interpretation of the will of another are based on the doctrines
of power of appointment, incorporation by reference and facts
of independent significance. 6
The testator's will can be saidto create a power of appoint-
ment in another to be exercised through the donee's will. It is
not necessary to grant a power of appointment in those words;
3. The heirs at law contended that there was no valid will. The two cases
were consolidated. The validity of the will was upheld.
4. S.C. CODE AxN. § 19-205 (1962).
5. 94 CJ.S. Wills § 183 (1956).
6. See PAGE, WILLs § 34.35 (3d ed. 1961).
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all that is required is a power to dispose through a will, 7 or a
gift to legatees or devisees under another's will. s The power of
appointment fails if the donee of the power predeceases the
testator.9 At least one case,10 however, has upheld a power of
appointment even though the donee predeceased the testator, but
the result would be better justified on the doctrine of facts of
independent significance.11 The failure of the power of appoint-
ment may cause the gift to fail totally,12 or the gift may be
saved on other theories.'8
A paper may be incorporated into the testator's will provided
that "it was in existence at the time of the execution of the will,
is referred to as being in existence, and is identified by satis-
factory proof as the paper referred to."1 4 Whether the paper is
executed or not, it becomes a part of the will.15 All three condi-
tions must be met in order that the doctrine apply. Thus a pro-
vision that gifts were to be distributed in accordance with direc-
tions in "a little book marked A on inside cover, which will be
found with my will"16 did not incorporate the book marked "A"
because there was no evidence that the book was in existence at
the time of the execution of the will. A gift to William Jennings
Bryan was held invalid because the letter instructing the testa-
tor's wife to give the gift was not referred to as being in exist-
ence. 17 Identification of the document to be incorporated may
be established by parol evidence,' 8 but parol evidence cannot be
used to change the character of the instrument referred to in the
will.19 In addition to these requirements, it is necessary to show
7. E.g., In re McCurdy's Estate, 197 Cal. 276, 240 Pac. 498 (1925).
8. E.g., In re Piffard's Estate, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888).
9. In re McCurdy's Estate, 197 Cal. 276, 240 Pac. 498 (1925); Curley v.
Lynch, 206 Mass. 298, 92 N.E. 429 (1910) ; Condit v. De Hart 62 NJ.L. 78, 40
Atl. 776 (1898) ; In re Piffard's Estate, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888).
10. Murchison v. Wallace, 156 Va. 728, 159 S.E. 106 (1931).
11. See text at note 21 infra.
12. E.g., Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289, 92 N.E. 429 (1910).
13. E.g., Condit v. De Hart, 62 N.J.L. 78, 40 AtI. 776 (1898).
14. ATKnqsoN, Wmr.s § 80 (2d ed. 1953) ; See, e.g., Richardson v. Byrd, 166
S.C. 251, 164 S.E. 643 (1929).
15. E.g., Richardson v. Byrd, 166 S.C. 251, 164 S.E. 643 (1929); Milledge
v. Lamar, 4 Desaus. 617 (S.C. 1816).
16. Appeal of Sleeper, 129 Me. 194, 151 Atl. 150, 152 (1930).
17. Appeal of Bryan, 77 Conn. 240, 58 At. 748 (1904). In a subsequent
appeal the letter was not allowed as a declaration of the trust upon which the
money was bequeathed to the wife. Bryan v. Bigelow, 77 Conn. 604, 60 Atl.
266 (1905).
18. E.g., In re Estate of Hopper, 90 Neb. 622, 134 N.W. 237 (1912) (identity
of deeds).
19. E.g., Daniel v. Tyler's Ex'r., 296 Ky. 808, 178 S.W.2d 411 (1944).
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that the testator intended that the document be incorporated.
Mere mention of a document does not show sufficient intent to
incorporate. 20 Provisions for a gift to a trust set up by the testa-
tor are often said to incorporate the trust agreement by refer-
ence. 21 Especially where the trust is amendable, these cases
should be considered under the doctrine of facts of independent
significance.
The doctrine of facts of independent significance has long
been recognized, although not under that specific designation.
A gift to "the wife of my youngest son" will be upheld where
the youngest son is unmarried at the time the will is executed. 22
A subsequent marriage is non-testamentary in nature and has
significance apart from disposing of property under the will.
The same reasoning is applied in cases involving contents of a
house, box or other container.23 The non-testamentary signifi-
cance of the act can become minuscule as the court in Hasting
v. Biidge2 4 pointed out.
It is manifest that such holdings give a testator a wide range
of power to alter the destination of property passing under
his will, without doing any testamentary act. If he had ten
boxes numbered consecutively, and willed the contents of
each to a different legatee, he could cut down or increase
their respective takings at pleasure.25
Nevertheless, courts regularly uphold the validity of such be-
quests without consideration of the doctrine. In the case of a
bequest of a "house and land together with all fixtures," the
question is more likely to concern what things are included in
the bequest than a consideration of whether or not the bequest
itself is valid.
2 6
The doctrine has been used to incorporate documents into a
will where incorporation by reference fails. As early as 1857 an
account book was referred to in order to determine the size of
gifts under a testator's will.27 A later court in In re Piffard's
20. First Nat'l Bank of Janesville v. Nelson, 355 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1966).
21. See generally Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to the Trustee of an
Inter Vivos Trust, 50 MicH. L. REv. 33 (1951).
22. Knowles v. Knowles, 132 Ga. 806, 65 S.E. 128 (1909).
23. See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 466 (1966) for a collection of the
"content" cases.
24. 86 N.H. 247, 166 AUt. 273 (1933).
25. Id. at ,166 Ad. at 274.
26. E.g., In re Falvey's Will, 15 App. Div. 2d 415, 224 N.Y.S2d 899 (1962).
27. Langdon v. Astor's Ex'r., 16 N.Y. 9 (1857).
26
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Estate2s allowed a gift to pass to devisees and legatees under the
will of the testator's daughter after recognizing that the gift
could not be upheld on the theory of a power of appointment
because the daughter had predeceased the testator. The will was
nevertheless referred to for determining to whom the gift should
pass. In Leary 'v. Liberty Trust (o.29 a bequest to the estate of
the testator's brother was upheld.
In none of these exemplary cases were the technical require-
ments for incorporation by reference or power of appointment
met; however, the courts were unwilling to let the clear intention
of the testator be frustrated by the technical requirements. The
results are justified under the doctrine of facts of independent
significance. In cases in which the will of a third person is in-
volved, there is a sufficient guarantee against fraud because the
third party's will must be witnessed in accordance with the
Statute of Wills.80 The theory was apparently relied upon to
sustain the use of a clause in a third person's will where such
a clause had no purpose except to designate the testator's lega-
tees.3 1 There the act had no non-testamentary significance, but
the will of the testator was carried out.
Trust agreements have also been held to be exemplary of the
types of documents which may have significance apart from
their effect upon the disposition of the property devised or be-
queathed by the will.32 Problems arise both where the trust has
no existing corpus and where the trust is amendable and revo-
cable.3 If the trust has no corpus, it may have the status of a
"shell without a body,"3 4 and gifts to it are said to be void be-
cause of lack of non-testamentary significance.8 Where the trust
is amendable, the problem is the determination of the testator's
28. 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888).
29. 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.. 828, 69 A.L.R. 1239 (1930). Contra Gardner v.
Anderson, 114 Kan. 778, 227 Pac. 743 (1923), aff'd 116 Kan. 431, 227 Pac. 747
(1924), on grounds that an estate is not a person or legal entity capable of
taking property.
30. RESTATEMENT, PROPEETY § 34(f) (1940).
31. Condit v. DeHart, 62 NJ.L. 78, 40 Atl. 776 (1898).
32. This is the test used by RESTATEMENT (SacoxD), TRuSTS § 54 (1959)
for use of trust agreement to identify beneficiaries of the trust and the purposes
of the trust.
33. See Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos
Tnust, 50 MIcH. L. Rav. 33 (1951).
34. E.g., Canal Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 157 Me. 309, 171 A2d 919, 920
(1961).
35. See Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to the Truntees of an Inter Vivos
Trust, 50 Micr. L. REv. 33 (1951).
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intention. Did the testator intend to leave property to the trust
as it existed at the time of the execution of the will or to the
trust as amended at his death? This problem led the court in
President & Direotors of Manhattan Go. v. Janowitz3 6 to reject
the doctrine of facts of independent significance where the trust
is revocable and amendable. Another court has said that the
"testatrix beyond doubt intended ...to add property to the
trust as it existed at her death."3 7 The result seems to be correct
for a testator probably does desire his gift to go to the trust as
it exists at his death.
In South CJarolina Nat'l Bank v. (Jopeland,8 Sarah's gift to
the trust could be upheld only upon application of the doctrine
of facts of independent significance. Robert predeceased Sarah;
therefore, a power of appointment in Robert could never become
effective. Incorporation by reference would be impossible with-
out a relaxation of the general standards. Sarah's will did not
refer to Robert's will then in existence, but rather to the one
which would be probated. The probated will was substantially
different from the will in existence at the time Sarah executed
her will.
The court's reason for refusing to apply the doctrine of facts
of independent significance is hazy at best. One of the cases
cited by the court as expositive of the doctrine contains a sim-
ilar gift. 9 There the gift was to go to the executor and trustees
under the will of testatrix's husband. The gift was to be dis-
tributed "according to the terms and conditions of the will of
my said husband."40 The intention of the donor is insignificantly
changed if she then adds to the gift above the words, "as if the
language in my said husband's will were copied at length herein
with appropriate changes to make them a part of my will." 41
It is true that the added language is an attempt at incorporation
by reference, but the failure of the attempt does not change the
intention of the donor. Since Robert's will was an act with sig-
nificance independent of the disposition of Sarah's property,
36. 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1940).
37. Canal Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 157 Me. 309, 171 A2d 919, 920 (1961).
38. S.C. , 149 S.E.2d 615 (1966).
39. In re Gregory's Estate, 70 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1954).
40. Id. at 905. Compare the language of this gift with Article III of Sarah's
will in text at footnote 1 jupra.
41. This is the language used by the court in South Carolina Natl Bank v.
Copeland, S.C. , 149 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1966), with "husbands" substi-
tuted for "brothers."
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reference to it should have been allowed in determining to whom
and for what purposes the gift in Sarah's will was given. Wheth-
er she intended to set up a South Carolina trust, as the court
found, or to contribute to an existing Texas trust, as seems more
likely, application of the doctrine of facts of independent sig-
nificance would have allowed Robert's will to declare the terms
of the trust. Because the court chose to dispose of the case in
another manner, the fate of the doctrine of facts of independent
significance as applied to gifts to trustees under the will of
another must be decided at a later date in South Carolina.
WUA"M T. ToA
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